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Abstract
The article aims to find the answer on the main question of how can the criminalisation of IUU fishing, especially when committed by OCGs, under suppression
conventions tackle the deficits of regulations and enforcement at the international
and national levels? These deficits have origin in the limited prescription by international fisheries instruments and a large autonomy and discretion of states leading
to substantive divergent policies, legal framework and practices at the national level.
Further, the actual international fisheries instruments do not provide for regulatory
and enforcement solutions in relation to the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing.
We argue that suppression conventions at global and regional levels could serve as
solutions to supplement the deficits. In explaining the argument, first we examine
the phenomenon of IUU fishing and its TOC dimensions, and the significant harms
caused by it. Second, we examine the regulations and enforcement provisions of
international and national fisheries instruments to establish the deficits. Third, we
elaborate why suppression conventions are suitable solutions. Fourth, we analyse
how suppression conventions can be regulated at global and regional levels in a way
that they tackle the deficits. The results of this study can be used as a reference on
how a transnational crime can be criminalised under suppression conventions both
in terms of its reasonings and options and thus can contribute to the study of transnational criminal law. This study is important for transnational criminal law scholars, policy makers and practitioners in the field of enforcement.
Keywords IUU fishing · Transnational organised crime · Organised criminal
groups · Suppression conventions · Transnational criminal law
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Introduction
The literature on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU fishing)1 has mainly
focused on the discussions on the regulations and enforcement of IUU fishing as
a fisheries conservation and management problem and much less on the involvement of Organised Criminal Groups (OCGs) in IUU fishing. A vast body of literature can be found on IUU fishing as a fisheries conservation and management problem including those by Caddell and Molenaar (2019), Kaye (2016), Palma-Robles
(2016), Klein (2011), Palma et al. (2010), and Hey (1999). The existing literature
mainly centred their discussions on the provisions and its applications provided by
international and regional fisheries instruments that relate to IUU fishing including the UNCLOS,2 the Compliance Agreement,3 the UNFSA,4 the IPOA-IUU,5
the PSMA6 and those by different Regional Fisheries Management Organisations
(RFMOs). These provisions provide the basis for the adoption and implementation
of different preventive and enforcement measures for coastal, flag, and port states
which are relevant to tackling IUU fishing.7
The existing vast literature of IUU fishing discussed above has touched very little
on the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing. This is understandable since the phenomenon of OCGs in IUU fishing has just only recently received attention. A number of legal and criminology literatures have presented the involvement of OCGs
in IUU fishing activities such as those by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC 2020), Petrossian (2019), C4ADS (2018), Martinez and Martinez
(2018), Van Uhm and Siegel (2016), Warchol and Harrington (2016), Goga (2014)
and Liddick (2014). In one example, Van Uhm and Siegel (2016) exhibited the connection between Russian OCGs and the illicit trade of caviar around the Caspian
Sea. Another example by Warchol and Harrington (2016) presented the involvement

1
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing can be understood generally as fishing activities that
violate or undermine national, regional, and international fisheries regulations and also the measures of
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). See also description of IUU fishing provided
in Paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU).
2
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 71 (UNCLOS).
3
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (adopted 24 November 1993, entered in force 24 April 2003) 2221
UNTS (Compliance Agreement).
4
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 4 August 1995, entered in force 11 December 2001) 2167
UNTS 3 (UNFSA).
5
FAO, ‘International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’ (FAO 2001) (adopted 2 March 2001, endorsed 23 June 2001) (IPOA-IUU).
6
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’ (opened for signature 22 November 2009, entered into force 5 June 2016) (PSMA).
7
Some common measures can be found in these instruments including authorisation to fish, fishing vessel registration, denial of entry into port, boarding and inspection, and application of sanctions.
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of Chinese OCGs in the illegal abalone trade in South Africa. These studies have
presented the existence of OCGs in IUU fishing activities.
A limited number of literatures has recognised the need to address the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing and in other environmental crimes and proposed several solutions including by categorising IUU fishing as a TOC and applying criminal
law. Authors including Chapsos and Hamilton (2019), Yuliantiningsih et al. (2018),
Vervaele (2016), Bondaroff et al. (2015) and Telesetsky (2015) are in this category.
This article aims to contribute to the literature relates to the OCGs involvement in
IUU fishing by exploring the phenomenon and offer possible solutions relating to
regulations and enforcement through the application of suppression provisions at
global and regional levels.
This research is a legal study aimed to find the answer to how IUU fishing can
be criminalised under suppression conventions. The methodology of this research is
doctrinal legal research (Hutchinson and Duncan 2012). The doctrinal legal research
is carried out through the interpretation and examination of existing regulations and
legal and criminology literature review which are used to answer the main question:
How can the criminalisation of IUU fishing, especially when committed by OCGs,
under suppression conventions tackle the deficits of regulations and enforcement at
the international and national levels?.
The article starts with a short overview of IUU fishing ((its conditions, harms and
its linkage with transnational organised crime (TOC)) before continues to the discussions on the deficits of international and national fisheries instruments. In explaining
the international instruments deficits, an analysis of international fisheries instruments, i.e. the UNCLOS; the Compliance Agreement, the UNFSA, the IPOA-IUU,
and the PSMA is conducted to establish the regulations and enforcement deficits of
international fisheries instruments in addressing the TOC dimensions of IUU fishing. These instruments have been selected because they represent the global regime
of fisheries conservation and management measures covering coastal, flag and port
states.
For the national deficits, the study examines Indonesia and Vietnam as national
case studies. Both countries have been selected due to two reasons. First, they
have significant positions in the global marine capture production where Indonesia
ranked 3rd and Vietnam ranked 7th in the global marine capture producers (FAO
2020: 13) and thus have substantial interests in complying with international fisheries instruments. Second, both countries suffer from rampant IUU fishing, but under
two different sets of circumstances. On the one side, Indonesia represents the “victim” of the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing, where many of its fish stocks are
plundered causing significant harm to the country. However, it is also acknowledged
that Indonesian vessels are also involved in IUU fishing operations, although it is not
as massive as Vietnam. On the other side, although Vietnam is represented as both
a victim and “perpetrator” of IUU fishing where many of its vessels are engaged in
transnational IUU fishing, causing harm and concerns in the affected countries. The
two case studies will inform how in practice, IUU fishing is transnational both in
its operations and actors. Thus, a purely national solution is not visible, and solutions should be at regional and global level. Both case studies will also inform that
national regulations are divergent and many of them do not address the involvement
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of OCGs in IUU fishing. This too, justify the need for regional and global solutions
to harmonise regulations against OCGs involvement in IUU fishing to limit their
operations. Based on the findings on the deficits of the global and national fisheries
instruments, this article then concludes with proposals for solutions at global and
regional levels.

IUU fishing conditions and harms
It was estimated that IUU fishing produces between 11–26 million tonnes of fish
each year and it has been escalating for the past 20 years (Agnew et al. 2009: 1).
The Pew Charitable Trusts states that IUU fishing accounts for more than 1,800 lb
of wild-caught fish stolen from the world’s seas every second (The Pew Charitable
Trusts 2013: 1). The United States Coast Guard, in its 2020 IUU Fishing Strategic
Outlook, estimates that one in five fish caught around the world could have originated from IUU fishing (The United States Coast Guard 2020: 3). The increasing
trend of IUU fishing has made the United Nations General Assembly (UN Doc A/
RES/74/18: para 80) recognise it as “…one of the greatest threats fish stocks and
marine ecosystems and continues to have serious and major implications for the conservation and management of ocean resources, as well as the food security and the
economies of many States, particularly developing States …”. Due to the extensive
scale and coverage of the operations, the significant harms caused and the involvement of OCGs, IUU fishing can be considered as a global crime (Petrossian 2019).
A closer look at the practice of IUU fishing can also be seen from a regional setting. In Southeast Asia, for example, the problem of IUU fishing has become one of
the major maritime challenges in the region. The issue is acknowledged by Southeast Asian countries, where they underlined that “IUU fishing is a serious concern
and threatens the sustainability of the region’s fisheries management and conservation measures, fishery resources and aquatic ecosystems, as well as economic viability and food security” (Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), 2016). A study by Petrossian (2019: 78–80) also acknowledges that “Unlike
South America, Africa, and Europe where countries experience different degrees
of illegal fishing, countries in Southeast Asia are equally vurnerable to very high
degress of illegal fishing”.8 Williams (2013: 259) argues that although there are no
accurate estimates as to the extent of IUU fishing, the general levels may be drawn
from Agnew et al. (2009) of three regions, namely, the Eastern Indian Ocean, the
Northwest Pacific and the Western Central Pacific which covers the Southeast Asian
waters. The study argues that the three regions had among the highest estimated percentages of IUU fishing globally, namely 32%, 33% and 34% respectively between
8

Petrossian quantifies the degree into a range between 0 to 10. Very high degree refers to a range
between 8 to 10. A score of “8” “refer to “there is a great deal of half as much of legal vessels fishing
illegally in the country’s waters” while a score of “10” indicates that “there are as many as or more than
legal vessels fishing illegally in the country’s waters”. There are 22 countries identified as having “very
high degrees” of illegal fishing, including Southeast Asian states i.e. Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
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2000 and 2003 (Agnew et al. 2009), which reflect that IUU fishing has become a
major problem for the region (Williams 2013: 259).
IUU fishing activities have resulted in harms to the economic, social, environmental and legal order aspects. The economic harms are estimated globally at
USD10-USD23.5 billion per year (Agnew et al. 2009: 4). Meanwhile, in Asia, the
region’s loss has been estimated at between USD6 billion and USD20.75 billion per
year, representing between 4.5 and 14.4 million tonnes (Bay of Bengal Large Marine
Ecosystem (FAO/BOBLME Secretariat) 2015: 1). Numerous states have suffered
from IUU fishing. For example, Indonesia loses between USD1.5 and USD4 billion
while Vietnam loses between USD669 million and USD1.8 billion (FAO/BOBLME
Secretariat 2015: 182, 390). States suffer losses of revenue at the national level from
the fish that is illegally removed from the country to the loss of licensing fees and
taxes (Meere and Delpeuch 2015: 36). The economic costs of IUU fishing could disrupt the development agenda particularly when the countries are heavily dependent
on the fisheries sector (Meere and Delpeuch 2015: 36).
The harm principle posits that conducts which cause or may cause serious or significant harm to others provide a sufficient condition for state’s intervention through
criminal law and the determination of such categorisation is under the authority of
the state (Peršak 2014: 15, 17). Harms are often seen from an anthropocentric perspective where human is the central point and harms only exist when humans are
the main victims both directly and indirectly (Van Uhm 2016: 66). In the context of
IUU fishing, the harms to humans can be seen from economic, social, environmental
and legal order aspects. Green criminologists then extend the harms approach where
humans are not the only victims, but non-human species and ecosystems can also be
regarded as victims of human actions (White 2011; Van Uhm 2016; Brisman and
South 2019; White 2018). In the context of IUU fishing, for example, the harms can
be extended to the non-human species (i.e. fish) and ecosystem (i.e. marine ecosystem) as IUU fishing depletes fish stocks and impairs the health and function of
marine ecosystem through overfishing and using destructive methods.
The environmental harms of IUU fishing are obviously detrimental since conservation and management measures are being disregarded. The activity places tremendous strain on the already depleted fish stocks and seriously affects the efforts to
rebuild them. In addition, IUU fishing is also inflicting damage on seabirds, marine
mammals and sea turtles. For example, in the Southern Ocean, illegal long-line vessels are estimated to kill 100,000 seabirds, including tens of thousands of endangered albatrosses annually (Palma et al. 2010: 11). The harms to the environment
caused by IUU fishing is not only limited to the fish stocks and the sea creatures.
The violation of conservation and management measures by IUU fishing actors
also has detrimental impacts on the marine ecosystem. The depletion of fish stocks
and sea creatures can impact the biodiversity and structure of the marine ecosystem
and impair its health and function. Further, those who carry out IUU fishing often
employ destructive fishing methods such as the use of poisons and blast fishing
(Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2008: 40). These methods have the
potential to damage sensitive marine habitats crucial to the marine ecosystem such
as coral reefs which can take up to 25 years to recover (Palma et al. 2010: 10). The
broad coverage of harms inflicted by IUU fishing can also be considered as harms to
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the commons since IUU fishing causes harms to common areas and resources such
as marine ecosystem, fish stocks, sea creatures that are key for the living conditions
and survival of all species, including human beings.
In terms of social harms, the existence of IUU fishing activities can displace
legitimate fishers since IUU fishing operates at lower costs which leads to unfair
competition. This could also induce legitimate fishers to participate in IUU fishing
itself to keep up with the competition. The declining fish stocks, caused by IUU fishing, also disrupt the livelihood of legitimate fishermen. The lower fish catch could
lead to lower employment and lower household incomes which contribute to the
increasing level of poverty, particularly among coastal and artisanal fishers (Agnew
and Barnes 2004: 199). Thus, IUU fishing is disrupting the social status in fishing
communities where livelihoods depend on marine resources and provoking a culture
of crime and non-compliance (Telesetsky 2015: 969).9
On the legal order harms, IUU fishing undermines the legal order by violating
fisheries laws and regulations at national, regional and global levels. IUU fishing
actors conduct their activities in an organised manner with advanced technology
and extensive networks. In doing so, they often engage in illicit collaboration with
corrupt law enforcement officials to avoid the reach of applicable laws and regulations and to exploit the weak regulations and enforcement in numerous countries. In
the same line, Liddick (2014: 309) correctly states that “IUU fishing is a significant
transnational crime problem that causes severe economic, social and environmental
harm”. He further argues that IUU fishing should be recognised “not merely as a
manifestation of a profit-driven, transnational crime perpetrated by corporate interests and organised criminals, but also a phenomenon–not unlike transnational organized crime in general—that is linked to, if not derivative of, weak, incompetent and
corrupt governance” (Liddick 2014: 310).
IUU fishing activities further undermine the legal order through links with the
involvement of OCGs. The activities can also be linked to other TOCs such as trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, people smuggling, bribery and money laundering (UNODC 2011, C4DS 2018). The involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing and its
links with related TOCs exacerbate the adverse impacts of IUU fishing on the legal
order.

IUU fishing & transnational organised crime
The organised crime dimensions can be found through the involvement of OCGs in
large-scale IUU fishing operations are particularly apparent in the case of high-value
fish products such as abalone, shark fins, sturgeon, caviar, totoaba and European
9

The example of provocation of the culture of crime and non-complance can be seen, for example from
the study by Daan van Uhm and Dina Siegel on the illegal trade of black caviar in the Caspian Sea where
many unemployed workers and fishers often resort to poaching. It was also found that senior government officials, fishery inspectors, police services and other agencies are involved in the illicit activities.
See Daan van Uhm and Dina Siegel, ‘The Illegal Trade in Black Caviar’ (2016) 19 Trends in Organized
Crime 67.
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eels. A high profit margin is one of the main pull factors for these OCGs. For example, one kilogram of raw abalone costs about USD40 in South Africa and sells for
as much as USD3,900 for retail customers in Asia (Warchol and Harrington 2016:
23). In South Africa, Chinese OCGs exploited local fisherman to obtain abalone and
then smuggled the majority of the abalone to Asia through Mozambique or Zimbabwe, while the rest was supplied to the South African market (Warchol and Harrington 2016: 25, 32). A study found that abalone traffickers in South Africa are
found to be mainly Asians, have the form of fraternal rather than hierarchal, and
have horizontally structured organisations where individuals have a large degree of
autonomy (Goga 2014: 4). These traffickers also have an established link with drug
dealers where they trade abalone for Mandrax or methamphetamines, or the ingredients for methamphetamine production (Goga 2014: 4). A study by the UNODC in
2011 also showed the involvement of OCGs in abalone poaching in South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand, with Asia as the main market (UNODC 2011: 98–103).
More recent studies on totoaba trafficking in Mexico to China (Martinez and Martinez 2018: 149–170; Crosta et al. 2018) and on European glass eel trafficking to
Asian market (UNODC 2020: 93–105) have also shown the involvement of OCGs in
the trafficking of the two species. The widespread existence of OCGs’ involvement
in IUU fishing is also highlighted in a study by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime where it is suggested that the OCGs’ involvement can be
found in many parts of the world, from New York’s Fulton Fish Market to groups
from the former Soviet Union, China, South America and South Africa (Bondaroff
et al. 2015: 55).
In Southeast Asia, the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing is also evident from
numerous cases in the region. The case of the fishing vessel “Viking” among others, showed how the vessel had the characteristics of OCGs (Tanjung Pinang District Court Decision (2016) No. 17/Pid.Sus-PRK/2016/PN Tpg). The “Viking” crew
consisted of a Chilean national as the captain and ten crew members coming from
Argentina, Chile, Indonesia and Peru. Their main purpose was to obtain financial
benefits from their operations (The Maritime Executive 2016). “Viking” was put
under the purple notice10 of Interpol and listed as an IUU fishing vessel by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).
The vessel had been engaging in IUU fishing activities in different countries for ten
years under twelve different names and eight different flags before it was sunk by
the Indonesian government on 14 March 2016 (Tanjung Pinang District Court Decision 2016). In addition to “Viking”, there are similar cases, such as “Sino” (Ambon
High Court Decision 2015), “Pusaka Benjina” (Indonesian Supreme Court Decision
2015), “Kunlun” (INTERPOL 2015) and others, where the involvement of OCGs
can be linked to IUU fishing operations across Southeast Asian waters.

10
The purple notice is an international request for cooperation or an alert issued by Interpol with the
aim to ‘seek or provide information on modus operandi, objects, devices and concealment methods
used by criminals.’ See INTERPOL, ‘Notices’ < https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notic
es > accessed 11 September 2017.
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Both transnational and organised crime dimensions magnify the already significant harms of IUU fishing and thus pose major challenges for states, regional communities and the international community in securing fisheries resources. Thus, it
is paramount for the international community to consider the involvement of OCGs
when tackling the global problem of IUU fishing. However, as will be discussed
below, the existing international and national fisheries instruments have deficits in
their regulatory and enforcement designs and practices. These deficits can be seen
from two sub-questions. First, whether international fisheries instruments allow
states to exercise a wide discretion in designing and applying their regulations and
enforcement systems and measures against IUU fishing and thus leads to substantive
divergent policies, legal framework and practices at national level?. Second, whether
the international fisheries instruments provide any solution in their provisions for
addressing the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing?.

Deficits of international fisheries instruments at a global level
The first sub-question of this article (i.e., whether international fisheries instruments
allow states to exercise a wide discretion in designing and applying their regulations and enforcement systems and measures against IUU fishing which leads to
substantive divergent policies, legal framework and practices at national level?)
can be tested at a global level from five international fisheries instruments i.e. the
UNCLOS, the Compliance Agreement, the UNFSA, the IPOA-IUU and the PSMA.
These international fisheries instruments give states wide discretion in formulating and applying their regulatory and enforcement designs and practices. A wide
range of regulatory and enforcement systems and measures can be found in different
states, from a mere administrative fine with limited or non-existent deterrent effects,
civil sanctions to imprisonment. For example, some states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Micronesia, Tanzania, Grenada, Barbados and Nigeria address IUU fishing in
their territorial seas by relying more on criminal sanctions against offenders (Palma
et al. 2010: 150) while other states such as Spain, Portugal and Vietnam rely more
on administrative sanctions (Cacaud et al. 2003).
Nevertheless, on sanctions, some of these instruments provide general guideline
where such sanctions should be of sufficient severity to secure compliance, discourage violations, and to deprive offenders from enjoying the benefits from the illegal
activities as can be seen from Article III(8) of the Compliance Agreement, Article
19(2) of the UNFSA, and paragraph 21 of the IPOA-IUU. Article III(8) of the Compliance Agreement and Article 19(2) the UNFSA, for example, provide sanctions
against violations in terms of refusal, withdrawal or suspension of authorisations.
Paragraph 21 of the IPOA-IUU provides that sanctions may include the adoption
of civil sanction regimes based on an administrative penalty scheme. These international fisheries instruments only provide general guidelines where such sanctions should be of sufficient severity to secure compliance, discourage violations,
and to deprive offenders from enjoying the benefits of from the illegal activities.
These instruments do not have a preference on which enforcement system should be
applied by states. Thus, states have wide discretion in designing and applying their
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enforcement system which can be administrative, civil or criminal. The divergent
national regulations and enforcement systems and practices could be exploited by
IUU fishing actors, including by operating in jurisdictions with the least punitive
sanctions so that their operations can continue without significant barriers. This condition is confirming the first sub-question in this article.
On the second sub-question (whether the international fisheries instruments provide any solution in their provisions for addressing the involvement of OCGs in
IUU fishing?), the international fisheries instruments do not consider at all the TOC
dimensions, particularly OCGs’ involvement in their provisions. The provisions of
international fisheries instruments are directed more towards the “regular” actors of
IUU fishing. This is understandable since the attention on OCGs’ involvement is
relatively recent (one of the earliest identified discussion was on 2008 (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2008), and it was not a determinant factor in the establishment of
these instruments. This lack of consideration of OCGs’ involvement in IUU fishing
in the international fisheries instruments confirmed the second sub-question of this
article.

Deficits of international fisheries instruments at a national level
The two conditions of sub-questions found in the existing international fisheries
instruments are also evident at the national level. On the first sub-question, the wide
variation in fisheries regulations and its enforcement among states can be seen from
different studies such as Beke et al. (2014) which identifies variation of fisheries
regulations and enforcement among the European Union member states and Cacaud
et al. (2003) which also confirmed the wide variation of regulations and enforcement
systems and measures among selected countries in Europe, Africa, Latin America,
North America, and South Pacific. The two studies confirmed that countries, at
national level, apply a variety of enforcement systems and measures against fishing
violations.
A further examination on the wide discretion in fisheries regulations and its
enforcement at national level can be seen from case studies of Indonesia and Vietnam. Both Indonesia and Vietnam suffer from IUU fishing operations. Indonesia is a
victim of IUU fishing where domestic and foreign vessels are fishing illegally in its
national waters (Chapsos and Hamilton 2019). However, it should also be acknowledged that Indonesian vessels are involved in IUU operations. In the efforts to deter
IUU fishing by foreign-flagged vessels, Indonesia also employs a “burning and/or
sinking policy”. The legal basis for this policy can be found in Article 69 (1) and (4)
of the Law on Fisheries. Article 69 (1) states that ‘fisheries surveillance vessel has
the function to implement surveillance and law enforcement in the field of fisheries in the Republic of Indonesia Fisheries Management Area. While Article 69 (4)
states that ‘in implementing the function stated in Article 69 (1), investigator and/
or fisheries inspectors can undertake special actions such as burning and/or sinking the foreign-flagged vessels based on prima facie evidence. Some impacted countries of the burning and/or sinking policy such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines
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and China were complaining the Indonesia’s policy (Nainggolan (2015). Against the
responses, the Indonesian government has been taking a firm stance by stating the
burning and/or sinking policy is the implementation of the law (Maulana 2015). The
practice of burning and/or sinking still continues until now. For example, from Januari to March 2021, there had been 26 foreign-flagged vessels sunk by Indonesian
government (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 2021). The policy is said to
deter IUU fishing vessels from conducting their illegal operations in the Indonesian
waters. To reduce the environmental impact, the vessels were perforated to become
houses for fish (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 2021).
Vietnam is also suffering from IUU fishing activities in its waters carried out by
domestic and foreign vessels. However, Vietnamese vessels are also the perpetrators of IUU fishing in foreign waters, ranging from the neighbouring waters including Indonesia and Malaysia to the waters of Pacific countries such as New Caledonia and the Solomon Islands. In Indonesia, for example, Vietnamese vessels are the
top violators where from 2014–2019 there had been 320 Vietnamese vessels sunk
by the Indonesian authorities (Directorate General of PSDKP 2020). Other vessels
from countries in the region such as Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand are also
conducting IUU fishing in Indonesia, although their numbers are significantly lower
than Vietnam. Vietnam’s high number of IUU fishing incidences has resulted in the
European Commission identifying that Vietnam had failed to discharge its responsibilities as the flag, port, coastal or market state under international law and had
failed to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. To this effect, the
European Commission issued a formal notification (“yellow card”) against Vietnam
(Commission Decision C 364/3 of 2017).
Regarding regulations and enforcement against IUU fishing, Indonesia lays down
its sanction provisions in detail in the fisheries laws and relevant ministerial decrees,
while Vietnam put the sanctions into the criminal code and into the law on handling
administrative violations together with other non-fisheries offences. Both countries,
in their legislation, have the option to apply both administrative and criminal sanctions against IUU fishing violations. Regarding administrative sanctions, Indonesia
has imposed licence-related sanctions such as issuing a warning, freezing of licences
and revocation of licences without imposing a fine in its Fisheries Laws (Law No.
45 of 2009 and Law No. 31 of 2004), while Vietnam chose to impose a fine as the
main form of sanction and also additional sanctions such as suspension of licence,
suspension of operation, confiscation of material evidences and remedial measures
in Government’s Decree No. 42/2019/ND-CP of 2019 on Administrative Sanction in
the Fisheries Activities. Regarding criminal sanctions, both countries apply criminal imprisonment and a fine against IUU fishing offences with different application.
Indonesia, for example, for using prohibited gear or methods, Indonesia, in Article
84 of Law No. 31 of 2004, imposes imprisonment up to a maximum of 6 years and a
maximum fine of IDR 1.2 billion (approximately USD84, 507).11 Vietnam, however,

11

In this study, 1 USD is equal to IDR 14,200.
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in its Criminal Code, divides criminal sanctions for fisheries violations into three
categories, based on the amount of losses of aquatic resources and the severity of
the actions. For using prohibited gear or methods which causes a loss of aquatic
resources ranging in value from VND100,000,000 (approximately USD4,329)
to VND500,000,000 (approximately USD21,645),12 Article 242(1) of Law
No.12/2017/QH14 on Amendments to the Criminal Code No. 100/2015/QH13,
only imposes a fine of VND 50,000,000 (approximately USD2,164) up to VND
300,000,000 (approximately $12,987) or a penalty of up to 3 years’ community sentence or from 6 to 36 months’ imprisonment. The period of imprisonment and the
amount of fine increases along with the loss caused by the offence. The variety of
regulations and enforcement provisions between the two countries is possible due
to the wide discretion given by the international fisheries instruments to states. The
wide discretion in this case has led to substantive divergent policies, legal framework and practices which can be exploited by IUU fishing actors, including OCGs.
On the second sub-question, the lack of provisions on the involvement of OCGs
in IUU fishing at a national level can be seen among others from a study by Telesetsky (2015) on Russia, Japan, China, Taiwan and the United States. The study shows
that the five countries provide some possibilities for criminal enforcement against
fisheries violations. Nonetheless, the study highlighted the fact that there is a lack
of clarity on the relationship between IUU fishing and organised crime in the five
countries’ fisheries provisions (Telesetsky 2015: 978). The lack of provisions on the
involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing can also be seen in the case of Indonesia and
Vietnam. IUU fishing operations in both countries show indications of involvement
by OCGs. In Indonesia, the involvement of OCGs is more apparent in the IUU fishing operations by foreign vessels where the operations are transnational and carried
out by groups with significant number of crew, better vessels and equipment. These
groups conspire with local actors in conducting their illegal operations. IUU fishing
operations in Indonesia are also connected to other TOCs, such as trafficking in persons, drug trafficking and migrant smuggling (Chapsos and Hamilton 2019; IOM,
KKP and Coventry City 2016; Missbach 2016). For example, a notorious “Benjina
case” in the Maluku island of Indonesia in 2015 where more than 1,000 fishermen
from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand were trafficked in IUU fishing-related
operations (Chapsos and Hamilton 2019; IOM, KKP and Coventry City 2016). In
Vietnam, the indication of involvement of OCGs is more apparent in the transnational operation of its vessels in foreign waters. Some of the Vietnamese vessels
are operating for months in foreign waters and some have even been accompanied
by mother ships and armed with guns, which shows the seriousness of the problem
(Shah 2017). Unfortunately, despite the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing in both
countries, neither country appears to give consideration to the involvement of OCGs
in IUU fishing as there are no specific provisions or enforcement practices in the
legislation of either country related to the involvement of OCGs. This lack of consideration for OCGs involvement thus answers the second sub-question.
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Rationale for IUU fishing criminalisation
One of the main reasons to criminalise conduct that is particularly harmful to
society is deterrence (Ashworth and Horder 2013: 16–17). In this sense, the
enactment of criminal law against certain conduct is an attempt to protect the
interests of society against the harms that are caused by such conduct and to deter
or prevent the same conduct happening in the future (McCaffrey 2008: 1015).
The harms to others provide a sufficient (or even necessary) condition for states’
intervention through criminal law; this is known as the ‘harm principle’ (Peršak
2014: 15). The conduct that would fall into the category of the harm principle is
that which causes or may cause serious or significant harm, and the determination
of such categorisation is under the authority of the state (Peršak 2014: 17).
The act of organisation of individuals, existing for a period of time, acting
in concert, aiming to commit breaches of fisheries regulations and/or fisheries
offences to obtain financial benefits, can cause greater harms than individuals
acting alone (Fickenauer 2005: 78). These collective actions, thus, pose greater
risks to society than individual actions and are worthy of a greater punishment
(Schloenhardt 2010: 12). This notion can also be applied to the involvement of
OCGs in IUU fishing where the harms caused by OCGs are arguably significantly
greater than those generated by the “regular” actors of IUU fishing such as fishermen or fishing companies which do not have the characteristics of OCGs.
Criminal law protection of the environment should be used when the essential
interests related to the preservation of the commons are at stake (Vervaele 2016:
243). Thus, all serious harms to these common interests, committed by gross
negligence, recklessness or intent, deserve the protection and enforcement of the
criminal law (Vervaele 2016: 243). Harms caused to the environment, in particular, and its TOC dimensions have triggered a new interest in protecting the environment through criminal law (Vervaele 2016: 251). IUU fishing, as explained
above, causes significant economic, environmental, social and legal order harms.
The amplification of harms caused by OCGs’ involvement in IUU fishing is
argued in this study to be a qualifying condition for the intervention of states
intervention through criminal law in protecting the environment. In this case, the
use of criminal law and its sanctions is preferable to civil or administrative law
for four main reasons. First, the application of criminal law shows a higher societal disapproval of IUU fishing than would be shown by the use of civil or administrative law. Second, the sanctions of criminal law can be more severe and serve
as a deterrent, e.g. the possibility to impose imprisonment, compared with civil
or administrative sanctions that generally take the form of monetary penalties.
Third, criminal law authorises the use of special investigation methods that are
needed in bringing perpetrators to justice, something that cannot be achieved by
civil or administrative law. Fourth, criminal law enables the use of international
cooperation mechanisms such as MLA (Vervaele 2015) and extradition (Harrington 2015) that are generally not used by civil or administrative law.
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Suppression conventions as solution for IUU fishing criminalisation
Boister (2002: 199) defines suppression conventions as “multilateral treaties that
oblige states to criminalise certain forms of conduct and to provide legal assistance
to other states in order to suppress ‘treaty crimes’ or crimes of ‘international concern’”. Another description is provided by Currie and Rikhof (2013: 328), who see
suppression conventions as “treaties agreed by states, usually multilateral, to coordinate crime suppression efforts among them”. In general, suppression conventions
can be considered to have four main elements: i) substantive law, ii) jurisdiction, iii)
investigative tools, and iv) international cooperation. Historically, few efforts were
made to coordinate cross-border prohibition, jurisdiction, and enforcement due to
national sovereignty in criminal justice matters. States cooperated mainly on a partial and reactionary basis which responded to the perceived problems of the time
(Currie and Rikhof 2013: 328). However, Currie and Rikhof (2013: 328) observe
that there has been increasing willingness among states to increase and expand
cooperation, resulting in the growing sophistication and complexity of the conventions. Until now, different conventions have been concluded to suppress particular
transnational crimes including transnational organised crime, slavery,13 corruption,14 and trafficking in persons.15
One of the main objectives of suppression conventions is to criminalise certain
harmful transnational conduct. The decision as to whether a specific transnational
conduct has reached a certain degree of harm and therefore deserves to be criminalised under a suppression convention is in the hands of like-minded states. In deciding which transnational conduct deserves to be criminalised, Boister (2018: 13)
acknowledged that “there is no clear international system to identify and respond
to transnational criminal threats and nor is it clear what weight of evidence of a
threat is necessary to tip the scale towards suppression”. Nevertheless, this study
argues that there are several common factors that can be considered in determining whether a conduct ought to be criminalised under a suppression convention, i.e.
significant harms and the transnational and organised crime dimensions. These factors are common factors that can be found in numerous suppression conventions.
As shown above, IUU fishing is causing significant harms for states and it has clear
transnational and organised crime dimensions. Thus, it is argued in this article that
IUU fishing fits the criteria to be criminalised under suppression conventions. Such
criminalisation can be done at global and regional levels to limit the operation of
OCGs in IUU fishing.
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Slavery Convention (adopted 25 September 1926, entered into force 9 March 1927) 60 LNTS 253.
United Nations Convention against Corruption (adopted 31 October 2003, entered into force 14
December 2005) 2349 UNTS 41.
15
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Trafficking in
Persons Protocol) (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003) 2237 UNTS 319.
14
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Criminalisation of IUU fishing through suppression conventions
at a global level
At a global level, this study proposes three options in which IUU fishing could be
criminalised under a suppression conventions’ framework. The first option is to
criminalise IUU fishing under the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (UNTOC). There are two alternatives of doing this put forward in
this article, namely to categorise IUU fishing as a serious crime or to establish an
additional UNTOC Protocol against IUU fishing. The second option to criminalise
IUU fishing is for like-minded states to establish a stand-alone suppression convention against IUU fishing. The third option is to integrate suppression provisions into
the existing international fisheries instruments.
On the first option of IUU fishing criminalisation under the UNTOC, such criminalisation can be achieved through categorising IUU fishing as a serious crime as
the first alternative. Such categorisation can be pursued through a resolution from
like-minded countries using the framework of Commission on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) or the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to UNTOC.
As a second alternative, IUU fishing criminalisation under the UNTOC can also be
achieved through the establishment of an additional UNTOC Protocol. The new protocol on IUU fishing would take a supplementary position towards the UNTOC. The
UNTOC would still be the main reference point for tackling TOC in general. The
new protocol would not have to repeat the existing provisions such as extradition,
MLA, international cooperation and others since they are already dealt with in the
UNTOC as the parent convention. The new protocol would deal with more specific
provisions relevant to its subject matter which would supplement the general provisions of the UNTOC jurisdictions and measures that can be taken by flag, coastal
and port states.
On the second option of establishing a stand-alone convention against IUU fishing, such a stand-alone convention could be established when states come to an
agreement that IUU fishing with TOC dimensions is a transnational organised crime
that needs to be suppressed globally. Significant harms caused by OCGs’ involvement in IUU fishing could be the foundation of a common consensus for criminalisation among concerned states. Since these harms are not exclusively confined within
national borders, states have stronger reasons to unite their interests into forming an
agreement to suppress IUU fishing through criminalisation under a stand-alone suppression convention.
On the third option, namely that of integrating suppression provisions into the
existing international fisheries instruments, any of the five international fisheries
instruments has the potential to accommodate the suppression provisions, although
it largely depends on the endorsement of the States Parties.16 However, it should be
16
The discussion on large-scale harms to the environment relates to the concept of ecocide. Ecocide is
described as “the extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether
by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that
territory has been severely diminished” (Higgins et al. 2013: 257). Ecocide has been proposed as the
missing fifth crime against peace or international core crime in the ICC Rome Statute in an attempt to
protect the environment (Higgins et al. 2013: 257; Vervaele and Van Uhm 2017).
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acknowledged that those international fisheries instruments focus mainly on the conservation and management of marine living resources and are less interested in the
criminal justice approach. There are three alternatives that can be used in pursuing
the third option: i) amendment of instruments; ii) establishment of an implementing
agreement; and iii) establishment of a voluntary instrument. With regard to the first
alternative, namely the amendment of instruments, each instrument has a mechanism of amendment, with the exception of IPOA-IUU as it is a voluntary instrument. The UNCLOS (Articles 312–313), for example, provides States Parties with
an opportunity to propose an amendment to the Convention and to communicate
such proposal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Similar opportunities
for amendments can also be found in the Compliance Agreement (Article XIII), the
UNFSA (Article 45) and the PSMA (Article 33). Although, hypothetically, amendment is possible, in reality amending a multilateral agreement has always been a
difficult and arduous process. The second alternative is to establish an implementing
agreement attached to the specific instrument. This process could bypass the need
for amendment by appealing to a number of interested States Parties which could be
the drivers of the whole process and parties to the implementing agreement. However, the process of establishing an implementing agreement could be lengthy. An
example of this is the process of establishing an agreement on marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ), as an implementing agreement of the UNCLOS (Oude Elferink 2019). Until now, the BBNJ process has taken
almost two decades since its first inception in 2004. A similarly arduous process
could also happen with an implementing agreement with suppression provisions.
The third alternative, taking a lesson from the IPOA-IUU, is to establish a voluntary
instrument such as a guidance or a plan of action which would incorporate suppression provisions to be implemented voluntarily by interested states.
Recommendation at a global level
This article proposes that the criminalisation of IUU fishing under the UNTOC
would be the most suitable option compared with the other two based on three categories: scope of application, feasibility and operationality. In terms of scope of
application, member states of the UNTOC have already agreed on the limitation
under Article 3 which requires the involvement of OCGs and the element of transnationality in the offence. States can then focus on other substantive aspects of IUU
fishing, such as determining which offences would be criminalised, the jurisdictions
on different areas such as internal and territorial waters, EEZs, high seas and ports,
and the additional investigative tools such as aerial surveillance. In terms of feasibility, the UNTOC also has the advantage where states can use the existing substantive
foundation and mechanism rather than starting from scratch. In terms of operationality, the UNTOC could be a better alternative since it already has existing institutional support, i.e. the UNODC, which, ideally, could provide resources in terms
of expertise and funding. The preference for the UNTOC in this article does not
exclude the two other options entirely as they also have their advantages. The final
decision concerning which option will be pursued is in the hands of the states.

13

Trends in Organized Crime

Criminalisation of IUU fishing under suppression conventions
at a regional level
Regional cooperation is important in tackling transnational crimes. Bulmer-Thomas
(2001: 363) asserts that “almost every country in the world has chosen to meet the
challenge of globalisation in part through a regional response”. This assertion is
also true in the case of transnational crime. Different regional arrangements have
emerged to respond to the threats of transnational crime. For example, the European
Union established the Convention against Corruption involving Public Officials.17
In the Asia–Pacific region, countries established the Bali Process in 2002 to address
people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime.18 In Southeast Asia, the ASEAN established the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in
Persons, especially Women and Children (ACTIP) (ASEAN 2015a) and the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) to oversee the region’s fight
against transnational crime.
This article proposes two options that can be pursued for the criminalisation of
IUU fishing under suppression conventions at a regional level, i.e. the establishment
of a stand-alone regional suppression convention and the integration of suppression
provisions into regional fisheries instruments. The details of how the criminalisation
of IUU fishing can be implemented in a regional setting in this article are further
explained in the context of the Southeast Asia region.
On the option of establishing a stand-alone regional suppression convention, the
development of a new regional legal instrument in the fight against transnational
crime is encouraged by the ASEAN Plan of Action in Combating Transnational
Crime (2016–2025) (ASEAN 2017). The Plan of Action, in its objectives (section
IV(1)), opens up the possibility of expanding the AMMTC and Senior Officials
Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC)’s scope of responsibility to deal effectively with new methods and forms of transnational crime where it is necessary and
mutually agreed. This could include future transnational crimes that are deemed to
be worthy of suppression, including IUU fishing. Section V (Legal Matters) then
encourages States to explore the possibility of developing new regional legal instruments in the areas of transnational crimes under the purview of the AMMTC and
SOMTC.
On the option of integrating suppression convention provisions into the existing regional fisheries instruments, this article examines four instruments related to
the Southeast Asia region. The first possibility is the existing RFMOs which have
mandates covering parts of the Southeast Asia region, i.e. the Commission for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).

17
Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union on the Fight
Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of
the European Union [1997] OJ C195/2.
18
The Bali Process is a Regional Consultative Process established in 2002 with 49 members. For more
information see: https://www.baliprocess.net/.
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The second possibility is the ASEAN Guidelines for Preventing the Entry of Fish
and Fishery Products from IUU Fishing Activities into the Supply Chain (Mazalina
et al. 2015). The third and fourth options are the Strategic Plan of Action on Cooperation on Fisheries 2016–2020 (ASEAN 2015b) and the Regional Plan of Action
to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices, including Combating IUU Fishing in the
Region (RPOA-IUU). Among these options, integration into existing RFMOs is not
a suitable option since none of the three RFMOs have the competence to cover all
the region’s waters, and there is only partial participation by Southeast Asian states
in these RFMOs. This would hinder the effective implementation of regional criminalisation as the suppression provisions would then only apply to some parts and
some members of the Southeast Asia region. The integration of suppression provisions into the other three options would be more possible. These three instruments
are voluntary and non-binding, a trait that seems to be preferred by ASEAN member states where it comes to field of fisheries. If a regional arrangement were to be
voluntary and non-binding in nature, it is to be hoped that many Southeast Asian
states would want to sign-up. However, this would mean that there is a possibility
that some states would choose not to be bound by the suppression provisions, either
partially or wholly. There is also a possibility that the commitment level to a fully
pledged implementation would not be very high.
Recommendation at a regional level
This article proposes the establishment of a regional stand-alone convention against
IUU fishing as the more suitable option compared with the integration of suppression provisions into the regional fisheries instruments based on three categories:
scope of application, feasibility and operationality. In terms of the scope of application, the regional convention option has more flexibility than the integration option
since states have the freedom to frame the convention according to their needs,
whereas with the integration option states are somewhat confined within the boundaries of the existing conservation and management measures. In terms of feasibility,
the establishment of a regional stand-alone convention could become part of a growing trend of the establishment and ratification of regional legal instruments against
common threats to the region as shown in the case of the ACTIP (Yusran 2018:
258–292). This growing trend to ratify a regional legal instrument inclination is also
supported by the Kuala Lumpur Declaration (ASEAN 2015c) and the ASEAN Plan
of Action in Combating Transnational Crime (2016–2025) by opening up the possibility of the expansion of the concept of transnational crime and the inclusion of
IUU fishing as a transnational crime. In terms of operationality, the regional convention option is likely to have the support of the ASEAN Secretariat. As in the case of
ACTIP, the convention in its Article 24(2), has the support from the ASEAN Secretariat for supervising and coordination its implementation. If a regional convention
against IUU fishing were to be established, the ASEAN Secretariat is likely to be
tasked with supporting the convention.
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The Nexus between Regional and Global Criminalisation of IUU
fishing
To achieve greater success, regional criminalisation could serve as a complementary solution to the global criminalisation of IUU fishing. For example, in the case
of ASEAN, as all the ASEAN Member States (AMS) are parties of the UNTOC,
the stand-alone regional convention could serve as a complementary solution to the
UNTOC. The regional convention could draw from the UNTOC provisions so as to
establish synchronisation between the two while still taking into account regional
circumstances. This could result in greater support for the regional convention,
in both its establishment and implementation since all the AMS are parties to the
UNTOC and already familiar with the UNTOC provisions.
It should also be acknowledged that there is a possibility that global criminalisation cannot be realised and that regional criminalisation of IUU fishing is the only
option. The absence of global criminalisation would not lessen the value of regional
criminalisation. A relevant example in this matter is the criminalisation of corruption. Before the establishment of the UNCAC in 2003, a global instrument to fight
corruption, several regional conventions were established to cater to the regions’
needs to tackle and criminalise corruption, e.g. the Inter-American Convention
against Corruption of 1996 (Organization of American States 1996) and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.19 Based on these examples,
states in Southeast Asia could continue with regional criminalisation without having
any global criminalisation instrument already in place. Ideally all states in Southeast
Asia should become parties to increase effective implementation. However, if this is
not possible, at initial stage several like-minded states could lead the regional convention establishment with the main objective of participation from all Southeast
Asian states.

Conclusion
This article has shown that IUU fishing causes significant economic, environmental,
social and legal order harms. For example, IUU fishing activities have contributed to
the destruction of marine habitats such as coral reef and the depletion of fish stocks
which caused direct harm to human, non-human (i.e. fish) and the ecosystem. Moreover, in many cases, OCGs’ involvement in IUU fishing is evident and could magnify the harms caused by IUU fishing. In the context of the harm principle, these
extensive harms are qualifying conditions for State’s intervention through criminal
law. States would need to use criminal law to address these harms caused by OCGs’
involvement in IUU fishing. This intervention would be an instrumental part in the
efforts of preserving the commons.

19
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (opened for signature 27 January 1999, entered into force 1
July 2002) ETS No. 173.
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Considering the magnified harms caused by OCGs, this article argues that there
should be a clear and harmonised regulatory and enforcement system against OCGs’
involvement in IUU fishing, which can be done through criminal regulations and
enforcement under suppression conventions. In doing so, this article offers two solutions, i.e. criminalisation of IUU fishing through suppression conventions at global
and/or regional levels. At a global level, it is argued that criminalisation of IUU fishing is best implemented through the UNTOC with the establishment of an additional
Protocol. At a regional level (Southeast Asia), it is argued that the most suitable
means to pursue criminalisation is through the establishment of a regional standalone convention.
Both global and regional criminalisation would not replace or undermine the
existing fisheries instruments. Rather, they would act as complementary instruments
to the fisheries instruments by providing criminal regulations and enforcement systems that previously were not available to tackle the involvement of OCGs in IUU
fishing. The criminalisation under a suppression conventions framework would harmonise legal frameworks among states, provide a wide range of international cooperation tools, and send a strong signal to the international community that IUU fishing is a serious threat and that the conducting of such activity will lead to punitive
enforcement. Suppression conventions, both at global and regional levels, need to
be linked with relevant fisheries instruments in terms of expertise and cooperation
tools. By having both criminalisation and conservation and management instruments on the same wavelength, it is to be believed that the involvement of OCGs
could be addressed more effectively and, at the same time, that fisheries conservation and management measures could still be pursued.
If not tackled properly, the harms of IUU fishing and its TOC dimensions can create large-scale harms to the fish stocks, sea creatures and the marine environment in
general. The extensive harms of IUU fishing to the environment, if not abated, could
lead to ecocide or perhaps it is already starting to happen. In addition to IUU fishing, OCGs involvement can also be seen in other offences including trafficking in
endangered species and illicit waste disposal. Such involvement also exemplifies the
harms caused in each offence and thus requires states to intervene. In this context,
the use of criminal law, in particular through suppression conventions, can also be
an option for other environmental offences. To conclude, we would like to align ourselves with His Holiness Pope Francis (Bulletin of the Holy See Press Office 2019)
statement at the World Congress of the International Association of Penal Law
where His Holiness “appeal to all the leaders and actors in this area to contribute
their efforts to ensuring adequate legal protection for our common home.”
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